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DParty Leader or Party Reputation Concerns? How Vertical
Partisan Alignment Reins in Subnational Fiscal Proﬂigacy
Allyson Lucinda Benton, Centro de Investigación y Docencia EconómicasSome scholars argue that party leader considerations drive governors copartisan with presidents toward ﬁscal disci-
pline, while others argue that party reputation concerns guide their behavior. To demonstrate how to assess whether
either of these mechanisms is at work, I extend this analysis to the municipal level. If mayors aligned with both governors
and presidents are more disciplined than mayors aligned with presidents only, copartisan governors affect mayoral ﬁscal
behavior through party leader considerations. If mayors aligned with both governors and presidents are just as ﬁscally
disciplined as those aligned with presidents only, party reputation concerns drive mayoral ﬁscal behavior. Cross-sectional
time-series analysis of debt used to ﬁnance ﬁscal excess in municipal Mexico reveals support for the party-leader-concern
logic in this nation, but the party reputation logic (or both logics or neither logic) may be at work in others.ecentralized political systems have often been linked
to inefﬁcient public beneﬁts provision and oversized
public sectors, elevated budget deﬁcits and public debt
loads, and high inﬂation, ﬁscal crisis, andmacroeconomic in-
stability (Rodden andWibbels 2002; Treisman 2000;Wibbels
2000). Decentralization weakens intergovernmental policy co-
ordination by empowering subnational ofﬁcials to choose
public beneﬁts and spending with an eye toward their polit-
ical careers, producing subnational policy divergence (Rodden
and Wibbels 2002; Weingast 2014). While such policy diver-
gence is useful for accommodating diverse subnational policy
needs (Weingast 2009), the contracts regulating intergovern-
mental ﬁscal relations in these systems can create common-
pool resource dynamics in subnational spending that under-
mine national ﬁscal stability (Faguet 2014; Rodden 2002, 2003;
Rodden andWibbels 2002;Weingast 2009, 2014).
When intergovernmental ﬁscal contracts assign national
governments responsibility for generating tax revenues and
funding state governments through ﬁscal transfers—creating
vertical ﬁscal imbalances—state governors have an incentive
to deliver beneﬁts to constituents but without regard to efﬁ-
ciency. Constituents do not hold them accountable for tax-
beneﬁt distortions, forcing national governments to accept
their ﬁscal costs (Rodden 2002, 2003; Rodden and Wibbels
2002; Weingast 2009). When ﬁscal contracts allow states toAllyson Lucinda Benton (allyson.benton@cide.edu) is a research professor in the
Económicas (CIDE), Carret, México-Toluca 3655, Col. Lomas de Santa Fé, Méx
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excess state expenditures, state ofﬁcials have an incentive to
raise spending. Constituents do not hold them accountable
for ﬁscal excess, forcing national governments to accept its
costs (Rodden 2002, 2003; Rodden and Wibbels 2002; Wein-
gast 2009). Rebalancing intergovernmental relations is difﬁ-
cult because state governors often enjoy inﬂuence over na-
tional policy making through national legislatures, allowing
them to veto changes to state policy autonomy or ﬁscal re-
sources (Rodden 2002; Rodden and Wibbels 2002; Treisman
1999). State leaders’ national policy inﬂuence can force na-
tional governments to accept vertical ﬁscal imbalances, soft
budget constraints, and common-pool resource abuses (Wein-
gast 2014).
Decentralized political systems thus appear doomed to
struggles with state ﬁscal proﬂigacy, which raises the impor-
tance of ﬁnding ways to bring state ﬁscal policy into line with
nationalmacroeconomic goalswithout requiringmajor changes
to political institutions or ﬁscal contracts. In this vein, scholars
have noted that vertical partisan alignment between national
and state governments improves state ﬁscal discipline. Jones,
Sanguinetti, and Tommasi (2000) ﬁnd in Argentina that pro-
vincial governors copartisan with national presidents tend to
spend less than governors fromopposition parties. They argue
that presidential inﬂuence over the career paths of copartisanDivisión de Estudios Políticos at the Centro de Investigación y Docencia
ico, CDMX 01210.
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202 / Party Leader or Party Reputation Concerns? Allyson Lucinda Bentongovernors encourages them to moderate spending to appease
national presidents concerned with macroeconomic stability.
Opposition governors juxtaposed against presidents do not
face such top-down pressures and, instead, raise spending to
survive hostile national political environments. To make their
case, Jones et al. (2000) note that uniﬁed government (in the
United States) raises presidents’ capacity to encourage ﬁscal
prudence among national legislators who view national re-
sources in the same common-pool way that governors would
(e.g., Alt and Lowry 1994; Cox and McCubbins 2001; Mc-
Cubbins 1991).
Similarly,RoddenandWibbels (2002)ﬁndthatnationswith
greater shares of state governments copartisan with national
executives enjoy greater ﬁscal discipline cross-nationally. How-
ever, they argue that the main political threat to state gover-
nors in some nations may come from constituents whose
electoral connection leads them to punish national incum-
bents for macroeconomic instability. Although Rodden and
Wibbels (2002) note that presidents exert leverage over co-
partisan governors’ careers in some systems in the way de-
scribed by Jones et al. (2000), in other systems governors
might moderate their tendency to overﬁsh common-pool re-
sources out of concern for their copartisan presidents’ macro-
economic performance and its effect on their parties’ national
reputations, which can affect their own electoral fortunes.
Studies showing that strong macroeconomic performance
confers electoral beneﬁts on copartisan governors in some
politically decentralized systems support this link (e.g., Gélineau
and Bélanger 2005; Gélineau and Remmer 2006).
Vertical partisanalignment can thusmoderate the common-
pool resource dynamics often plaguing decentralized political
systems, although the precise mechanism through which this
occurs is unclear. In this study, I explain how to distinguish
between the alternative “party leader” and “party reputation”
mechanisms, something that scholars have not yet been able
to do (Rodden and Wibbels 2002). To this end, I theorize
about how each mechanism would operate at a third, lower
tier of municipal government found in most decentralized
systems but that has rarely been examined for vertical par-
tisan effects. Yet, municipal mayors often enjoy the same
policy and budgetary autonomy, and vertical ﬁscal imbal-
ances and soft budget constraints, as state governors, raising
spending around elections for political ends (Benton and
Smith 2017; Drazen and Eslava 2010; Sakurai and Menezes-
Filho 2008; Veiga and Veiga 2007). If mayors can raise spend-
ing for political purposes, then vertical partisan alignment
should matter to their calculations as well.
I show how comparison of the ﬁscal behavior of (1) mu-
nicipalities that share partisan allegiance with both state and
national executives to (2) municipalities that share partisanThis content downloaded from 200.010
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms alignment with only national executives to (3) municipalities
that do not share partisan allegiance with national executives
can be used to distinguish whether party leader or party rep-
utation logics drive vertical partisan effects. If municipalities
aligned with both state and national governments are more
ﬁscally disciplined than those aligned with only national in-
cumbents, then copartisan governors affect mayoral ﬁscal de-
cisions and party leader concerns matter for municipal ﬁscal
behavior. If municipalities aligned with both state and na-
tional ofﬁcials are just as ﬁscally disciplined as municipalities
aligned with only national copartisans, then copartisan gov-
ernors play no role in mayoral ﬁscal decisions and party repu-
tation concerns drive municipal ﬁscal behavior.
I demonstrate the usefulness of this approach using data
from Mexico. Mexico has a decentralized (federal) political
system with three tiers of government. Three main political
parties compete in national, state, and municipal elections,
producing a variety of vertical partisan alignments that I le-
verage to discern the nature of vertical partisan effects. Sta-
tistical analysis of municipal long-term debt shows that mu-
nicipalities copartisan with both national presidents and state
governors spend less than municipalities only aligned with
national presidents. “Party leader”—rather than “party rep-
utation”—concerns thus drive vertical partisan effects in this
nation. Importantly, the results for Mexico apply only to this
case. Other countries might enjoy vertical partisan effects
driven by party reputations or by both party reputations and
party leaders. They might also experience no vertical partisan
effects. As I explain below,where electoral systems allowparty
leaders to control subnational politicians’ access to political
opportunities, party leader concerns will likely guide their
ﬁscal choices. Where electoral systems raise the inﬂuence of
national party reputations over subnational politicians’ po-
litical careers, party reputation concerns will likely guide their
ﬁscal behavior.Where the inﬂuence of party leaders and party
reputations on subnational politicians’ careers is limited, ver-
tical partisan effects will likely be absent.
That vertical partisan effects work through different log-
ics—and sometimes might not be present at all—has impor-
tant policy implications for decentralized political systems.
To foreshadow the conclusion, the study suggests that the
top-down and bottom-up rules-based approaches most often
recommended for curtailing subnational common-pool re-
source abuses may work best when vertical partisan effects
follow either party leader or party reputation logics, respec-
tively. Otherwise, market-based approaches may work better
for reining in ﬁscal excess. In making this point, the study
contributes to debates about the best policy approaches to
managing subnational ﬁscal excess—and the subnational cap-
ital markets that ﬁnance it—in decentralized political systems..244.100 on January 10, 2019 06:21:40 AM
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PARTISAN EFFECTS
There are four possible vertical partisan alignments in three-
tiered decentralized political systems, shown in table 1. Among
mayors aligned with national presidents, mayors might share
partisan afﬁliation with state governors, or they might not.
Municipalities whose mayors share partisan afﬁliation with
both state and national executives are called NSM munici-
palities (Np national, Sp state, Mpmunicipal); those that
share partisan afﬁliation with only national presidents are
called NM municipalities. Among mayors not aligned with
national presidents, mayors might share partisan afﬁliation
with state governors, or they might not. Municipalities whose
mayors share partisan afﬁliation with only state governors are
SMmunicipalities; those that do not share partisan afﬁliation
with state or national executives are M municipal orphans.
Party leader concerns
I begin by considering relative NSM, NM, SM, and M mu-
nicipal spending under the “party leader” mechanism. The
core theoretical mechanism driving “party leader” vertical
partisan effects is grounded in political ambition theory and
howpoliticians build careers in vertically organized territorial-
based decentralized political systems where party leaders con-
trol access to political opportunities (e.g., Samuels 2003; Schle-
singer 1966). Here, party leaders at each level of the system
control access to political opportunities within their territo-
rial spheres of authority, promoting politicians up (anddown)
the hierarchical political career ladder. In such systems, pol-
iticians seek to appease their most proximate party leaders to
ensure access to elected and appointed government and party
posts, and party leaders look to their most proximate co-
partisan subordinates to ﬁll them (Kerevel 2015; Schlesinger
1966). Off-path promotions that bypass rungs on the hierar-
chical political career ladder risk discord and are fairly rare.
National party leaders are unlikely to promote municipal pol-
iticians to national posts if thismeans usurping the role of state
party leaders in overseeing municipal careers or passing overThis content downloaded from 200.010
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms state and national copartisans aspiring to these posts. State
party leaders are unlikely to promote municipal politicians to
state posts if this means passing over state copartisans seeking
these positions. This jibes with research showing the hierar-
chical paths of political promotion in party-leader-dominated
politically decentralized systems (Kerevel 2015), in contrast to
systems in which party leaders play no role in political pro-
motions and politicians are free to seek off-path posts (Bor-
chert 2011; Samuels 2003).
From the perspective of NSM andNMmunicipal mayors,
this means two things. First, national party leaders leave co-
partisan state party leaders to oversee their NSM and NM
mayors’ political careers. Second, NSM and NMmayors’ pros-
pects for promotion at the hands of state party leaders deter-
mine whether these mayors seek to appease them. State gov-
ernors (i.e., state party leaders controlling state government)
with access to both state government and state party resources
are better able to promote copartisan NSM mayors because
they control access to resources for winning municipal elec-
tions, elected state government and appointed state bureau-
cratic posts, and state party positions. NSM mayors thus ﬁnd
it politically expedient to engage in ﬁscal discipline to appease
copartisan state governors (who seek to appease copartisan
national presidents concerned with macroeconomic stability).
In contrast, out-of-power state party leaders have little to offer
their NM mayors. Without access to state government, out-
of-power state party leaders cannot appoint their NMmayors
to state bureaucratic posts or ensure that they retain munic-
ipal power or secure election to state ofﬁces. Elected state of-
ﬁces, along with appointed state party posts, are monopolized
by state copartisans awaiting the election of copartisan gov-
ernors or promotion to elected or appointed national posi-
tions. With limited career prospects in state government—or
in national government thanks to copartisan presidents’ re-
luctance to pass over state copartisans—NM mayors have
little interest in ﬁscal discipline, especially if it could spell the
loss of municipal political control. Instead, NM mayors ﬁnd
it expedient to raise ﬁscal spending to ensure their municipal
electoral survival in hostile state political environments, while
working toward the election of copartisan state governors.
The logic of party leader concerns thus suggests that NSM
mayors will be driven toward greater ﬁscal discipline than
NM mayors, who will spend similarly to SM and M mayors,
if thismechanismdrives vertical partisan effects. The presence
of ﬁscally proﬂigate opposition state governors juxtaposed
against national presidents—who are thus free to use public
spending to retain state power and to unseat NM mayors—
encourages NM mayors to spend similarly to SM (and M)
mayors to survive in municipal government. Without copar-
tisan national presidents, SM mayors’ copartisan state gov-Table 1. Municipal Vertical Partisan AlignmentsLevel of Government Possible Vertical Partisan AlignmentsNational N
State S S S S
Municipal M M M M
Summary notation NSM NM SM MNote. Hypothetical party 1 in bold, party 2 italicized, party 3 underlined.
N p national, S p state, and M p municipal level of government..244.100 on January 10, 2019 06:21:40 AM
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ﬁscal proﬂigacy on their chances of promotion to national
posts and may even perceive beneﬁts from it if it helps them
retain state political control. SM mayors are thus left—and
may even be encouraged—by copartisan state governors to
spend to ensure their municipal political survival while await-
ing state positions monopolized by state copartisans working
toward the election of copartisan national presidents.Without
higher-level copartisans, Mmayors are unchecked and free to
spend to survive hostile state and national political environ-
ments. In other words (see table 2):
Party Leader Concerns: If party leader concerns
drive subnational ﬁscal behavior, NSM mayors will be
more ﬁscally disciplined than NM mayors, with NM,
SM, and M mayors equally ﬁscally undisciplined.
Party reputation concerns
I now consider relative NSM, NM, SM, and M municipal
spending under the “party reputation” mechanism. The core
theoreticalmechanism driving “party reputation” vertical par-
tisan effects is grounded in retrospective economic voting
theory (e.g., Lewis-Beck 1988) and how politicians build ca-
reers in vertically organized territorial-based politically de-
centralized systems in which national macroeconomic per-
formance determines access to political opportunities. Here,
poor nationalmacroeconomic performanceundermines voter
support for national incumbents (LeDuc and Pammett 2013;
Singer 2013) and their subnational copartisans (Gélineau and
Bélanger 2005; Gélineau and Remmer 2006). Although electedThis content downloaded from 200.010
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and appointed government and party positions exist at all lev-
els, the chance that politicians will rotate through them de-
pends on national macroeconomic performance and whether
their parties are responsible for it. Strong macroeconomic
performance strengthens national incumbent reputations and
electoral support, increasing the political opportunities avail-
able to subnational copartisans. Weak national macroeco-
nomic performance weakens national incumbent reputations
and electoral support, reducing the opportunities available to
subnational copartisans.
From the perspective of NSM andNMmunicipal mayors,
this means that national macroeconomic instability stands
to undermine not only their national parties’ electoral sup-
port but also their individual political career prospects. As a
result, and to paraphrase Rodden and Wibbels (2002, 508),
NSM and NM mayors will have an incentive to make ﬁscal
decisions that support national macroeconomic stability when
their electoral and political fates are directly tied to those of
copartisan national presidents and national party reputations.
It is counterproductive for NSM and NMmayors to sabotage
copartisan presidents’ efforts to ensure macroeconomic sta-
bility with municipal ﬁscal excess. Instead, it is more polit-
ically expedient for them to make ﬁscal policy choices that
contribute to balanced national budgets, low inﬂation, macro-
economic stability—and thus their parties’ national reputa-
tions—in the interest of their political careers.
The logic of party reputation concerns suggests that both
NSM and NM mayors will be equally driven toward greater
ﬁscal discipline, compared to SM and M mayors facing in-
centives toward ﬁscal excess, if this mechanism drives vertical
partisan effects. Of course, copartisan state governors con-
cerned with the effect of their parties’ national reputations on
their own electoral prospects might seek to strengthen their
NSMmayors’ awareness of the electoral beneﬁts of ﬁscal pru-
dence.However, the same could be said for out-of-power state
party leaders and their copartisan NM mayors. If NSM and
NM mayors’ future political opportunities are determined by
the ability of copartisan national presidents to deliver macro-
economic stability, any additional appeals by copartisan state
governors or out-of-power state party leaders are unlikely to
affect NSM or NM mayors’ political calculations, especially if
they have already beneﬁted electorally from sound national
macroeconomic performance and their own ﬁscal contribu-
tion to it. As such, both NSM and NMmayors will be driven
to greater ﬁscal discipline compared to SM and M mayors
who are juxtaposed against national presidents and do not ben-
eﬁt electorally from—and are in fact electorally harmed by—
national macroeconomic stability. NSM and NM mayors face
national party reputation effects, whereas SM and M mayors
do not. In short (see table 2):Table 2. Vertical Partisan Effects under Different MechanismsCausal Mechanism
Relative Fiscal
Spending LevelsPresence of vertical partisan effects:
Party leader mechanism NSM ! NMp SMp M
Party reputation mechanism NSM p NM ! SM p M
Both party leader and party
reputation mechanisms
NSM ! NM ! SM p MAbsence of vertical partisan effects:
Vertical partisan spending NSM ≤ NM ≤ SM ! M
Vertical partisan national
bailouts/access
NSMp NM 1 SMpMVertical partisan national and
state bailouts/accessNSM ≥ NM ≥ SM 1 MNo vertical partisan logic
(nonpartisan bailouts/access)NSMp NMp SMp MNote. Np national, Sp state, and Mp municipal level of government..244.100 on January 10, 2019 06:21:40 AM
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cerns drive subnational ﬁscal behavior, NSM and NM
mayors will be equally ﬁscally disciplined, with both
NSM and NM mayors more ﬁscally disciplined than
SM and M mayors (who will be equally ﬁscally un-
disciplined).
Party leader and party reputation concerns
It is possible that both party leader and party reputation
concerns might drive NSM and NM ﬁscal behavior, that is,
that both party leaders and national party reputations might
affect subnational politician’s political career opportunities.
Rodden and Wibbels (2002) suggest this but do not elabo-
rate. Adding together the ﬁscal behavior of these two logics
leads to (see table 2):
Party Leader and Party Reputation Concerns: If
party leader and party reputation concerns drive sub-
national ﬁscal behavior, NSM mayors will be more
ﬁscally disciplined than NM mayors, with both NSM
and NMmayors more ﬁscally disciplined than SM and
M mayors (who will be equally ﬁscally undisciplined).
No vertical partisan effects
It is also possible that political careers in politically decen-
tralized systems might not depend on party leaders or party
reputations, undermining the incentive for subnational pol-
iticians to reduce spending on the basis of either of these con-
cerns. Evidence that NSM, NM, SM, and M mayors all suc-
cumb to common-pool resource dynamics and are similarly
ﬁscally undisciplined would show this. This would also sug-
gest the presence of vertical nonpartisan bailout expectations,
where vertical partisan alignment plays no role in moderat-
ing relative municipal ﬁscal behavior. Evidence that NSM
mayors spendmore than NM ones, who spend similarly to or
more than SM ones, who spend more than M ones, would
suggest the presence of vertical partisan national and state
bailout expectations, where municipalities with higher-level
copartisans expect bailouts and thus enjoy preferential access
to debt for ﬁnancing ﬁscal excess (see table 2).
Evidence that NSMmayors spend similarly to or less than
NM ones, who spend similarly to or less than SM ones, who
spend less than M ones, would show that vertical partisan
spending drives municipal ﬁscal behavior. Here, higher-level
government spending in copartisan municipalities enables
NSM,NM, and SMmayors to spend less thanMones. Greater
M spending compared to NSM, NM, and SM spending dis-
tinguishes vertical partisan spending from vertical partisan
effects.Where vertical partisan effects are present, SM andM
mayors are similarly ﬁscally undisciplined because they areThis content downloaded from 200.010
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms juxtaposed against national presidents (see table 2). Table 2
is not meant to be exhaustive but to show how other political
logics would produce relative NSM, NM, SM, and M ﬁscal
discipline different from that under vertical partisan effects.
EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
Mexico satisﬁes three conditions for examining theories about
vertical partisan effects: its federal system includes three tiers
of government, (at least) three main parties regularly win na-
tional and subnational executives, and loopholes in its federal
ﬁscal contract allow subnational governments to overspend.
Mexico is divided into 31 states and a federal district (desig-
nated a state in 2016), with states divided into about 2,440 mu-
nicipalities (depending on the year). The Institutional Revo-
lutionary Party (PRI) controlled Mexico during much of the
twentieth century, losing the presidency in 2000 but regularly
winning state and municipal ofﬁces. Two other national
parties also regularly win state and municipal elections: the
National Action Party (PAN), which won the 2000 and 2006
presidential races, and the Democratic Revolution Party (PRD).
The PRI reassumed the presidency in December 2012 (term
ending in December 2018).
Mexico’s federal ﬁscal contract dates to ﬁscal, public debt,
and banking reforms made between 1997 and 2000 that op-
erated mostly intact from 2001 to 2016, when a new public
debt law was approved. The 2001–16 ﬁscal contract purpose-
fully strengthened vertical ﬁscal imbalances: the national gov-
ernment retained most tax rights and funded states through
ﬁscal transfers (Díaz-Cayeros 2006); states redistributed a set
share of federal transfers to municipalities (Timmons and
Broid 2013). States andmunicipalities enjoyed some tax rights,
but they were insufﬁcient for meeting policy obligations. The
perverse ﬁscal incentives of Mexico’s vertical ﬁscal imbalances
arewell known (Cabrero andCarrera 2002; Giugale, Hernández-
Trillo, and Oliveira 2000).
Even so, the 2001–16 ﬁscal contract aimed at eliminating
the soft budget constraints of prior decades, implementing a
hybrid rules- and market-based system for managing access
to the subnational capital market (Giugale et al. 2000; Revilla
2013). However, several loopholes allowed subnational ﬁscal
proﬂigacy to persist. By law, states and municipalities were
not authorized to run ﬁscal deﬁcits, although they could use
short-term loans for cash management and to close year-end
ﬁscal accounts (Revilla 2013). In practice, however, short-term
loans were unregulated and could remain unreported to na-
tional authorities in subnational ﬁscal accounts, allowing sub-
national governments to run ﬁscal deﬁcits by leaving these
loans to accumulate (often unpaid) and reﬁnancing them with
long-term debt (Fitch Ratings 2011; Hernández-Trillo and Smith-
Ramírez 2009; Hurtado and Zamarripa 2013; Revilla 2013)..244.100 on January 10, 2019 06:21:40 AM
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nance “economically productive” public investment (outlined
in the national constitution) with long-term debt in Mexican
pesos, from authorized ﬁnancial institutions, and report it
to the secretary of the treasury and public credit (Secretaría
de Hacienda y Crédito Público [SHCP], http://www.shcp.gob
.mx). Unreported long-term debt would be risk reweighted
automatically by the SHCP’s National Banking and Securi-
ties Commission (Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores
[CNBV]), raising bank capitalization requirements (Giugale
et al. 2000; Revilla 2013).
Reﬂecting the rules-based aspect of Mexico’s approach to
managing subnational capital markets, state legislatures were
responsible for setting limits to state andmunicipal long-term
debt and for authorizing state andmunicipal long-term loans.
The approval of municipal councils was also needed for mu-
nicipal long-term debt. In practice, however, governors con-
trolled state legislatures and bureaucracies, and mayors, mu-
nicipal councils and bureaucracies, weakening oversight over
debt decisions and allowing long-term debt obligations to ex-
ceed formal limits (enacted in only about half of the states and
usually unenforced; Hurtado and Zamarripa 2013). At the
municipal level, electoral laws in all but six states guaranteed
mayors absolute majorities in municipal councils, while mu-
nicipal administrative structures guaranteed all mayors ab-
solute control over their bureaucracies (Merino 2006; Meza
2015; Pérez Durán 2008). Weak oversight and strong bureau-
cratic control allowed subnational governments to run up ever
larger debt.
By law, subnational borrowing had to be based on ﬁscal
solvency, with lenders holding capital reserves tied to it, re-
ﬂecting the market-based side of Mexico’s approach to man-
aging its subnational capital market (Hernández-Trillo and
Smith-Ramírez 2009; Revilla 2013). Subnational governments
seeking loans from private lenders had to secure formal credit
ratings (with one exception; see below) from authorized agen-
cies to prevent their loans from automatic capital risk re-
weighting (Hernández-Trillo and Smith-Ramírez 2009; Re-
villa 2013). Those seeking loans from public banks faced
internal bank ﬁscal appraisals, with these loans scrutinized by
the CNBV and capital risk reweighted as needed (Giugale
et al. 2000). In practice, however, subnational ﬁscal accounts
were nontransparent, with arrears to service providers and
public employees, other contingent liabilities (like pension
obligations), and (unsanctioned) ﬁscal deﬁcits (and the short-
term loans ﬁnancing them) unreported (Hernández-Trillo
and Smith-Ramírez 2009; Hurtado and Zamarripa 2013). Sub-
national governments also shopped for credit ratings to guar-
antee good reports and postponed bad ones, while competitionThis content downloaded from 200.010
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms between agencies for clients inﬂated ratings (Rosado Buenﬁl
2017). Subnational credit ratings and ﬁscal assessments were
often—if not usually—inconsistent with true subnational ﬁscal
positions (Hernández-Trillo and Smith-Ramírez 2009; Rosado
Buenﬁl 2017), with states and municipalities accessing credit
lines disproportionate to their ﬁscal capacity to repay.
Much of this was likely widely known, but subnational
governments could collateralize long-term debt with unear-
marked and earmarked ﬁscal transfers and own-source rev-
enues, with these resources intercepted by ﬁduciaries and
debt payments made before reaching subnational treasuries,
reducing the risk to repayment. In practice, however, debt
collateralization did not prevent subnational governments
from assuming debt obligations that neared the limit of or
exceeded the resources available for collateralization. The re-
sources collateralizing debt also declined during economic
downturns, affecting repayment. There were no hard bailouts
during the period under analysis, but soft bailouts occurred
when subnational governments were allowed to reﬁnance
short-term loans using long-term debt or to restructure long-
term debt to reduce payments (Fitch Ratings 2011; Hurtado
and Zamarripa 2013; Revilla 2013). National and state gov-
ernments often helped municipalities orchestrate access to
long-termcredit and interpreted theconstitution’s“economic
productivity” clause to include debt reﬁnancing and restruc-
turing (Fitch Ratings 2011; Hernández-Trillo and Smith-
Ramírez 2009; Hurtado and Zamarripa 2013; Revilla 2013).
Loopholes in Mexico’s approach to managing its subnational
capitalmarket thus created opportunities for subnational ﬁscal
excess (Benton and Smith 2017; Espinosa and Martell 2015;
Giugale et al. 2000; Hernández-Trillo, Díaz-Cayeros, and
Gamboa González 2002).
DATA AND STATISTICAL APPROACH
To distinguish between the party leader, party reputation,
and joint party leader–party reputation mechanisms under-
lying vertical partisan effects, I use a panel data set consisting
of 1,873 municipalities in Mexico across 11 years (2005–15),
with 20,603 possible observations. I exclude Oaxaca state’s
570 municipalities because a supermajority select govern-
ments using nonpartisan systems on different timetables. I ex-
clude the Federal District, as it operated like a state.
The dependent variable is yearly totalmunicipal long-term
debt from commercial banks or nonbank ﬁnancial entities (So-
ciedades Financieras de Objeto Múltiple, commonly known
as Sofomes). The SHCP has only published subnational long-
term debt obligations since 2005, so the study is limited to
2005–15 (falling under the 2001–16 ﬁscal contract). I trans-
form yearly debt obligations into per capita square roots to.244.100 on January 10, 2019 06:21:40 AM
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a logarithmic transformation, as municipalities can choose
zero liabilities.) Juárez, in the state of Coahuila, had per cap-
ita debt obligations nearly 40 times greater than the next-
indebted municipality in 2009 and 2010, when it was under
municipal and state PRI control juxtaposed against national
PAN rule (making it an SMmunicipality). I exclude this case,
as it could bias the results in favor of ﬁnding vertical partisan
effects. During 2005–15, 1,315 municipalities had long-term
debt, including 404 with commercial bank or nonbank ﬁ-
nancial entity debt, 1,206 with development bank debt, 208
with bond debt, and 95 with “trust” debt. Trusts are managed
by third-party ﬁnancial institutions, but the ﬁnance ministry
does not specify the type of debt managed by them. Among
municipalities with commercial bank or nonbank ﬁnancial
entity loans, debt from these sources averaged 107.90 pesos
per capita (SDp 276.25, minp 0, maxp 3,554.35). Data are
from the SHCP.
I examine long-term debt from commercial banks and
nonbank ﬁnancial entities rather than ﬁscal deﬁcits or ﬁscal
spending. As noted, municipal ﬁscal deﬁcits are unsanc-
tioned, with municipalities not reporting deﬁcits or spend-
ing beyond revenues. As noted, municipal governments used
short-term loans from commercial banks and nonbank ﬁ-
nancial entities to run unsanctioned ﬁscal deﬁcits, accumu-
lating these loans and reﬁnancing them with long-term credit
from these same institutions. Municipalities cannot use de-
velopment bank loans or bond emissions for short-term ﬁ-
nancing, reducing their capacity to reﬁnance such loans with
these institutions. Debt from commercial banks and nonbank
ﬁnancial entities thus serves as a good proxy for ﬁscal excess,
with loans from these institutions widely available to subna-
tional governments in Mexico.
Commercial banks have lent to subnational governments
in Mexico since the early twentieth century, and subnational
governments enjoy preexisting relationships with them be-
cause they handle other banking needs (Hernández-Trillo
et al. 2002). The operation of non-deposit-taking nonbank
ﬁnancial entities (the Sofomes) was authorized in 2006 in
an effort to deepen the nation’s credit market. These entities
(27 regulated, 3,060 unregulated) operate alongside 48 li-
censed and regulated commercial banks (Comisión Nacional
de la Protección y Defensa de los Usuarios de Servicios Fi-
nancieros, http://www.condusef.gob.mx). Unlike commercial
banks, nonbank ﬁnancial entities need not be licensed by the
CNBV and can opt out of CNBV regulation if they share no
equity links with commercial banks. Otherwise, they face the
same CNBV regulation as their supervisory banking institutions
(OECD 2011). Among nonbank ﬁnancial entities, municipalThis content downloaded from 200.010
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms short- and long-term debt was mainly supplied by the un-
regulated ones targeting municipalities underserviced by
more traditional lenders. Unregulated nonbank ﬁnancial en-
tities could also operate without meeting CNBV capitalization
requirements, facilitating their ability to lend to municipalities
with low/no credit ratings but that could still collateralize debt
with ﬁscal transfers or other revenues (thereby still attracting
these lenders).
The main explanatory variables are the four structures of
vertical partisan alignment. Dummy variables record whether
municipalities were NSM, NM, SM, or M in their alignment
each year. I considered any coalition between one of the main
national PAN, PRI, or PRD parties and any small party as
dominated by the main national party, which tended to be
the case in most municipalities. Between 2005 and 2012, the
PAN held the national presidency; between 2013 and 2015
(term ending 2018) the PRI held the presidency. The PAN,
PRI, PRD (on their own or in coalition with small parties),
and an infrequent PAN-PRD coalition won all state andmost
municipal elections. I consider state and municipal PAN-PRD
coalitions to be juxtaposed against national PAN rule. Ex-
cluding Juárez, there are 3,292 NSM, 3,293 NM, 7,055 SM,
and 6,888Mmunicipal-year observations in the data set. The
number of NSM, NM, SM, and M municipal-year observa-
tions totals 20,528 (rather than 20,603) because of the crea-
tion/elimination of municipalities that reduced their lives or
missing electoral data. Data are from state electoral institutes.
Municipalities might vary in their ability to access credit,
regardless of their capacity to collateralize debt. Municipal-
ities with greater ﬁscal resources have greater resources for
debt collateralization, while more heavily populated munici-
palities with better access to ﬁnancial institutions or larger tax
bases might be better able to access loans (Benton and Smith
2017; Freire 2014; Petersen and Huertas 2004; Thau 2011).
Municipal ﬁscal revenue (own source plus transfer revenue
[square root per capita]) and its lag, as well as municipal pop-
ulation (square root), capture this. I do not use municipal
credit ratings. Even if they were reliable (which they were
likely not), only those municipalities accessing debt from
commercial banks, regulated nonbank ﬁnancial entities, or
bond markets needed them. The inclusion of credit ratings
would lead municipal-year observations with only unregulated
nonbank ﬁnancial entity or development bank debt obliga-
tions, or no debt obligations, to drop out of the analysis in-
advertently.
Municipalities might vary in their incentive to access
credit. Low human development raises the need for public
investment (captured with Mexico’s marginality index; Sáez
2016). High vertical ﬁscal imbalances raise the incentive to.244.100 on January 10, 2019 06:21:40 AM
and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
208 / Party Leader or Party Reputation Concerns? Allyson Lucinda Bentonoverspend (measured as the ratio of transfer revenues to total
revenues; Rodden 2002, 2003; Rodden and Wibbels 2002;
Weingast 2009). Low municipal administrative capacity might
result in poor ﬁscal choices (captured with population, human
development, and vertical ﬁscal imbalances; Avellaneda 2009;
Ibarra Salazar, Sandoval Musi, and Sotres Cervantes 2001;
Mendoza 2004; Smith and Benton 2017). Mayors might raise
debt ahead of municipal elections or state gubernatorial races,
or amid weak political mandates (captured with mayoral and
gubernatorial election dummies, winning municipal margins;
Benton and Smith 2017; Drazen and Eslava 2010; Sakurai and
Menezes-Filho 2008; Veiga and Veiga 2007), even if vertical
partisan alignment affects the relative magnitude of these
effects. Partisan ideological differences might inﬂuence ﬁscal
spending (Benton andSmith 2017), or partisan organizational
differences might affect the strength of vertical partisan ef-
fects across parties (captured with partisan dummies). Data
are from the National Institute of Geography and Statistics
(http://www.inegi.gob.mx), its National Population Council
(https://www.gob.mx/conapo), and state electoral institutes.
I examine the data using linear Prais-Winston cross-
sectional time-series analysis with panel-corrected standard
errors. Unit-root tests (assuming a common autoregressive
process) show that the data are stationary, so I keep the data
in level form. Wooldridge tests for serial autocorrelation in
the residuals are signiﬁcant (p ! :01), so I correct all models
for a common autoregressive error process of order 1. Mod-
iﬁed Wald tests for group-wise heteroskedasticity in the re-
siduals are signiﬁcant (p ! :01), so I correct all models for
panel-level heteroskedastic errors (assuming no contempo-
raneous correlation across panels). (I could not correct for
panel-speciﬁc autoregressive processes or cross-panel con-
temporaneous correlation because of missing ﬁscal data.) I
include a lagged dependent variable in all models to account
for persistence, making the models dynamic (De Boef and
Keele 2008; Williams and Whitten 2012).
Year ﬁxed effects control for intertemporal variation in
(national/international) debt dynamics common to all mu-
nicipalities; tests for whether year dummies were jointly zero
were signiﬁcant (p ! :01). State ﬁxed effects control for state
differences that might affect municipal debt dynamics, such
as state ﬁscal policy, debt loads, debt ceilings, oversight over
municipal borrowing, and electoral laws allowing propor-
tional representation in municipal councils (that might raise
municipal oversight). I also prefer state ﬁxed effects to munic-
ipal ﬁxed effects on econometric grounds: two of the main
explanatory variables (the NSM and NM dummies) are time
invariant in most municipalities, and some of the controls are
highly sluggish (Clark and Linzer 2015). In addition to the
lagged dependent variable, I include all other municipal debtThis content downloaded from 200.010
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms types and their lags to control for any effect on commercial
bank or nonbank ﬁnancial entity debt.
STATISTICAL RESULTS
Table 3 presents the results. Model 1 examines the impact
of NM, SM, and M vertical partisan alignment compared to
NSM alignment (the omitted case) on the full sample of all
municipalities. As shown, NMmunicipalities acquired greater
per capita commercial bank and nonbank ﬁnancial entity debt
compared to their NSM counterparts, with the NM variable’s
coefﬁcient positive and signiﬁcant (p ! :01). SM and M mu-
nicipalities also assumed greater commercial bank debt com-
pared to NSM ones (p ! :05). Overlapping conﬁdence inter-
vals (ﬁg. 1A) around the NM, SM, and M coefﬁcients show
that they were not statistically different in their ﬁscal be-
havior. The results are in line with a party leader logic behind
vertical partisan effects.
Although I control for factors affecting municipal access
to subnational capital markets, it could be that municipali-
ties not accessing any type of debt are distinct from those
accessing some kind of credit. I therefore rerun the analysis
on the subsample of municipalities that accessed some kind
of debt in at least one year during the period under analysis,
excluding all municipalities that assumed no debt. The re-
sults in model 2 in table 3 are the same as for the full sample:
NSMmunicipalities assumed lower commercial bank or non-
bank ﬁnancial entity debt than NM, SM, and M municipali-
ties, who behaved no differently from one another (shown by
their overlapping conﬁdence intervals in ﬁg. 1B), in line with
the party leader logic.
It could also be that there is something different about
municipalities accessing private sector debt compared to mu-
nicipalities that rely on public development bank credit. I
therefore rerun the analysis on another two subsamples.
Model 3 in table 3 includes all municipalities assuming com-
mercial bank or nonbank ﬁnancial entity loans, regardless of
whether they contracted public development bank debt (ex-
cluding any municipalities that only assumed development
bank loans). Model 4 in table 3 examines the smaller sub-
sample that accessed commercial bank or nonbank ﬁnancial
entity debt as well as public development bank loans (ex-
cluding any municipalities that only accessed commercial
bank or nonbank ﬁnancial entity credit). Development bank
loans require technical assistance to improve ﬁscal reporting
and debt management, with municipalities assuming these
loans more transparent in their ﬁscal ﬁnances and use of
credit. The results are the same.
The results in table 3 show that NSM municipalities as-
sume lower per capita commercial bank or nonbank ﬁnan-
cial entity debt compared to their NM, SM, and M counter-.244.100 on January 10, 2019 06:21:40 AM
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in the short term. To demonstrate that this persists into the
longer term, I do two things. First, I estimate simple long-term
effects to show that they are in line with the short-term ones
(see app. 1; apps. 1–3 available online). Second, I conduct
“dynamic simulations” of the long-term effects of NSM com-
pared to NM, SM, and M vertical partisan alignment on com-
mercial bank or nonbank ﬁnancial entity debt, following the
Williams and Whitten (2012) procedure. (I prefer the simple
dynamic panel approach due to this procedure, but I report
results for dynamic panel models in app. 3; the results are the
same.)
Figure 1 presents the results for the dynamic simulations
for the full sample and the subsample of municipalities with
debt. The impact of NSM municipal partisan alignment in
lowering commercial bank or nonbank ﬁnancial entity debt
compared to NM, SM, and M municipalities persists and
grows over time. For example, among those municipalities
with some kind of debt (ﬁg. 1B), after just ﬁve years NM (SM
or M) municipalities each count on nearly three pesos per
capita more commercial bank and nonbank ﬁnancial entity
debt compared to their NSM counterparts (all other variables
at their means). For an NM (SM or M) municipality with
10,000 people, this amounts to about 30,000 pesos (or US
$2,750 at 10.89 Mexican pesos per US dollar in 2005) addi-
tional commercial bank or nonbank ﬁnancial entity debt
compared to a similar NSMmunicipality (beyond that already
owed). This seemingly small sum can loom large in the eyes of
mayors governing poor municipalities with other public spend-
ing and debt repayment obligations. It can also loom large in
the eyes of national presidents concerned about the macro-
economic impact of debt across all municipalities over time.This content downloaded from 200.010
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms ADDRESSING ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS
It could be argued that NSM municipalities assume lower
commercial bank or nonbank ﬁnancial entity debt because
they enjoy privileged access to other types of debt or beneﬁt
from “vertical partisan spending” (table 2). I dismiss these
possibilities. All models include controls for all other debt
types (and their lags), which account for any impact they
might have on commercial bank or nonbank ﬁnancial entity
borrowing. All models include controls for total municipal
ﬁscal revenues (and their lags), which account for any par-
tisan favoritism in state and federal transfers. The commer-
cial bank and nonbank ﬁnancial entity models show that
NSMmayors borrow less than NM, SM, andMmayors, with
no difference between NM, SM, andMmunicipal borrowing.
If vertical partisan spending were present but not accounted
for by the controls, then NSMmayors would borrow less than
NM and SM mayors, who would borrow less than M mayors
deprived of higher-level copartisans (table 2). This was not the
case.
It could be argued that some factor underlying vertical
partisan alignment—rather than vertical partisan alignment
itself—drives the difference between NSM compared to NM,
SM, and M municipalities in commercial bank or nonbank
ﬁnancial entity borrowing. If this is the case, then we should
observe the same vertical partisan effects across other types
of debt. If it is not, then we should not observe the same
vertical partisan effects across other types of loans. I there-
fore examine development bank and bond debt—where ver-
tical partisan effects should be absent—in a placebo test. Pub-
lic development bank loans rank alongside commercial bank
debt as the oldest type of subnational ﬁnancing in Mexico.
National governments likely push all or just copartisanFigure 1. Dynamic simulation of long-term party leader vertical partisan effects in Mexico. A, All municipalities; B, municipalities with debt. Commercial bank
and nonbank ﬁnancial entity debt in per capita square roots. Bars depict 95% conﬁdence intervals..244.100 on January 10, 2019 06:21:40 AM
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priorities in six-year national development plans. Develop-
ment bank debt thus should be devoid of vertical partisan ef-
fects. Models 5 and 6 in table 3 show that the NM term was
insigniﬁcant in the full sample and both the NM and SM
terms insigniﬁcant in the subsample with debt (see also app. 2).
Research is needed to understand development bank debt dy-
namics but, at least for the purposes here, the point is clear:
development bank debt is free from vertical partisan effects.
Bond emissions are much less frequent, newer (dating to
2001), and less well known. Many ﬁnancial institutions spe-
cializing in them do not provide short-term ﬁnancing or other
banking services, so they do not enjoy the same ties to mu-
nicipalities as commercial banks (or nonbank ﬁnancial enti-
ties catering to low-income individuals). However, municipal
bond emissions likely beneﬁt from higher-level copartisan gov-
ernments due to their help in organizing access to this source
of credit. Bond emissions should thus be devoid of vertical
partisan effects. Models 7 and 8 in table 3 (and app. 2) show
that NMand SMmunicipalities enjoyed lower bond debt than
NSM ones. Research is needed to unpack municipal bond dy-
namics but, for the purposes of this study, the point is clear:
bond emissions are free from vertical partisan effects.ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND VERTICAL
PARTISAN EFFECTS
That Mexico would enjoy party-leader-driven vertical par-
tisan effects is not surprising. Mexico is a politically decen-
tralized system where party leaders act as gatekeepers to
elected and appointed government and party ofﬁces, leading
politicians to appease their most proximate party leaders to
ensure their political careers (Kerevel 2015; Langston 2010).
The absence of immediate reelection rights for municipal
mayors and councilors (and for state and national legislators)
during the period under study, alongside the absence of all
reelection rights for state governors, reinforced party leaders’
inﬂuence over their subordinates (Kerevel 2015; Langston
2010).
It is likely that in politically decentralized systems where
party leaders control executive and legislative ballots and votes
are cast for parties—such as where party leaders determine
candidates for executive ofﬁce and use closed party lists to ﬁll
legislative seats—subnational politicians’ careers will depend
on appeasing party leaders, producing party-leader-driven
vertical partisan effects. Where party leaders do not control
executive or legislative ballots and votes are cast for candi-
dates—such as where politicians determine whether to run
in party primaries for executive ofﬁces and whether to ap-
pear on open party lists ﬁlling legislative seats—as long asThis content downloaded from 200.010
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms votes are pooled within parties, subnational politicians’ ca-
reers will depend on the strength of their personal support
and on the strength of their parties’ national reputations, pro-
ducing party-reputation-driven vertical partisan effects. Where
party leaders control executive and legislative ballots but votes
are cast for candidates—such as where party leaders deter-
mine participation in party primaries for executive ofﬁces and
in open party lists for legislative seats—as long as votes are
pooled within parties, subnational politicians’ careers will de-
pend on party leaders and party reputations, producing joint
party leader-party reputation vertical partisan effects.
The proliferation of political parties should weaken the
impact of vertical partisan alignment on ﬁscal behavior, as
politicians ﬁnd it difﬁcult to determine whom to appease to
ensure promotion (under the party leader logic) or to take
credit for national macroeconomic stability (under the party
reputation logic) amid multiparty coalition governments. In
politically decentralized systems where party leaders do not
control executive or legislative ballots and votes are cast for
candidates—such as where politicians determine whether to
run in party primaries for executive ofﬁces or appear on open
party lists for legislative seats—as long as votes are not pooled
within parties, subnational politicians’ careers will depend on
the strength of their personal support and not on party leaders
or party reputations, with no vertical partisan effects present.CONCLUSION
I leverage the presence of three tiers of government in polit-
ically decentralized systems to distinguish how vertical par-
tisan effects moderate subnational ﬁscal proﬂigacy. If mu-
nicipalities aligned with state and national governments are
more ﬁscally disciplined than those aligned with only na-
tional presidents, then copartisan governors drive mayoral
ﬁscal decisions and party leader concerns affect ﬁscal be-
havior. If municipalities aligned with state and national
executives are as ﬁscally disciplined as municipalities with
only national copartisans, then copartisan governors play no
role in mayoral ﬁscal decisions and national party reputation
concerns affect ﬁscal behavior. Examination of the debt types
most often used to ﬁnance subnational ﬁscal excess inMexico
shows thatparty leader concernsdrivemunicipalﬁscal choices
there, althoughmayors in other nationsmay respond to party
reputation concerns (or both or neither), depending on how
electoral rules shape subnational politicians’ strategies for
building political careers.
In showing how to distinguish between different vertical
partisan effects, the study contributes to debates about whether
rules- or market-based approaches are best for managing
common-pool resource dynamics in decentralized political.244.100 on January 10, 2019 06:21:40 AM
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Volume 81 Number 1 January 2019 / 213systems (Kelemen and Teo 2014; Martell and Guess 2006).
Systems in which vertical partisan effects are present might
beneﬁt from a rules-based approach to preventing subna-
tional ﬁscal excess. If subnational leaders facing copartisan
national presidents are inﬂuenced by top-down party leader
concerns to engage in ﬁscal discipline, national governments
can encourage ﬁscal discipline using a top-down rules-based
approach, like strengthening subnational budgeting rules
that improve national ﬁscal behavior in some systems (e.g.,
Alesina andPerotti 1996;Hallerberg, Strauch, and vonHagen
2007; von Hagen and Harden 1995). This suggests that Mex-
ican ofﬁcials should consider the same.
If subnational leaders facing copartisan presidents are
motivated by concerns about national party reputations and
how they affect voters from the bottom-up, national gov-
ernments can encourage ﬁscal discipline using a bottom-up
rules-based approach, like improving subnational ﬁscal trans-
parency to strengthen citizens’ capacity to detect ﬁscal excess
that improvesnationalﬁscal behavior inother systems (Alesina
and Perotti 1996; Alt and Lassen 2006). Systems facing both
party leader and party reputation vertical partisan effects
might consider a combination of top-down and bottom-up
rules-based approaches. In contrast, systems in which vertical
partisan effects are absent might beneﬁt from a market-based
approach to preventing subnational ﬁscal excess. Financial
market and banking regulations that raise the incentive and
capacity for subnational governments to disclose information
about their ﬁscal positions, raise ﬁnancial institutions’ capi-
talization requirements attached to subnational lending, and
strengthen the link between subnational ﬁscal positions, bank
capitalization requirements, and the terms/conditions at-
tached to loans can raise the costs of ﬁscal excess to subna-
tional borrowers and the lenders that make it possible (Freire
and Petersen 2004).
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